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Abstract
As an alternative to traditional academic schooling, vocational schooling in South Africa
may serve as a safety valve for students encountering difficulty in the transition from
school to work. Yet if ineffective, vocational schooling could also be a sinkhole, offering
little chance for success on the labor market. After defining the terms “safety valve” and
“sinkhole” in a model of human capital investment with multiple schooling types, I test
for evidence of these characteristics using a panel of urban youth in South Africa. I find
support for the safety valve role of vocational schooling, with a 1 percentage point
decrease in vocational enrollment in response to grade failure, compared to a decline
of 40 percentage points for academic enrollment. In contrast, I fail to find evidence that
vocational schooling is a sinkhole, with wage and employment returns at least as large
as those for academic schooling. The results suggest that vocational schooling plays an
important role in easing difficult school to work transitions for South African youth.
JEL classification: I25; J24; J31; O12.
Keywords: Human capital investment; Vocational schooling; Youth unemployment;
South Africa
1 Introduction
Youth unemployment far exceeds adult unemployment in most countries. Developing
countries are particularly concerned about youth unemployment because their younger
populations make the problem more severe. Low productivity levels and mismatch
between youth skills and employer demands are often cited asmajor contributors to youth
unemployment. Vocational education may be an effective means to provide youth with
skills that employers seek. Countries with high youth unemployment face the largest gaps
between the supply and demand of qualified young workers, and therefore might gain the
most from effective vocational education.
South Africa is a prime example of a country in which vocational education could
play this important role. Youth unemployment is exceptionally high, exceeding 50% in
recent years,1 with surprisingly few opportunities in the informal sector. Students face
wide variation in school quality and high rates of grade failure and repetition. Improving
the difficult school to work transition for youth, particularly for those from vulnera-
ble circumstances, is a key social and political issue. Vocational schooling, in which
about 400,000 students enroll at the secondary and post-secondary levels annually each
(Bunting and Cloete 2010; UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2011), offers the promise of an
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alternative educational path for students struggling in the general education system. The
South African government intends to expand vocational secondary programs by over 6
times current enrollment in the coming years (Oxford Business Group 2012). Yet little is
known about what types of students enroll in vocational programs in South Africa, why
they choose to enroll, or how they fare on the labor market.
This paper analyzes the role of vocational schooling in the school to work tran-
sition of South African youth. Specifically, I examine whether vocational schooling
serves as a “safety valve” for students struggling in traditional academic schooling, expe-
riencing adverse household shocks, or forming households. I also examine whether
vocational schooling benefits students after they leave, or whether (consistent with con-
cerns expressed by many South African students) it is a “sinkhole” offering little chance
for success on the labor market. After defining the terms safety valve and sinkhole in a
model of human capital investment with multiple schooling types, I test for evidence of
these characteristics in a panel of urban youth in South Africa.
I find support for the safety valve role of vocational schooling, with a 1 percentage point
decrease in vocational enrollment in response to grade failure, compared to a decline
of 40 percentage points for academic enrollment. These findings account for persistent
unobserved heterogeneity and remain after extending the model to account for multi-
dimensional ability and splitting the sample among various subsamples of interest. In
contrast, I fail to find evidence that vocational schooling is a sinkhole, with wage and
employment returns at least as large as those for academic schooling. Labor market
returns to both types of schooling are precisely estimated, so that these findings are not
due to large standard errors (the sample is underpowered to detect such differences when
distinguishing between secondary and post-secondary schooling of each type, however).
Although not causal, I use the method of Altonji et al. (2005) to present evidence that
these returns estimates are not driven by selection on unobserved characteristics. The
results suggest that vocational schooling plays an important role in easing difficult school
to work transitions for South African youth. Students who struggle to advance in aca-
demic programs may find it optimal to enter vocational programs, where they can earn
comparable returns.
Vocational schooling has been the subject of considerable previous economic research,
much of it focused on estimating comparative returns between vocational and gen-
eral/academic programs. For the developing world, Bennell (1996) provides an early
review, questioning the then-conventional wisdom that academic returns exceeded voca-
tional. Since then, a number of researchers have continued to estimate comparative
returns for individual developing countries. A partial list includes Egypt (El-Hamidi
2006; Krafft 2013), Indonesia (Newhouse and Suryadarma 2011), Taiwan (Rodgers et al.
2006), Tanzania (Hawley 2003, Hawley 2008), and Thailand (Kahyarara and Teal 2008),
with varying results regarding the direction and magnitude of comparative returns. Two
recent studies (Oosterbeek and Webbink 2007; Malamud and Pop-Eleches), rely on pol-
icy changes in the Netherlands and Romania, respectively, to isolate plausibly exogenous
changes in vocational schooling2. Both studies find little difference in labor market out-
comes between students with vocational and academic schooling as a result of the policy
change, and argue that non-random selection into these tracks drives the varying findings
of other studies in the literature. Hanushek et al. (2011), using data fromOECD countries,
find initial gains to vocational schooling that are overtaken by academic schooling later
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in working careers, providing another plausible explanation for contradictory findings
regarding returns. Becausemy sample is composed entirely of young adults, theHanushek
et al. (2011) results call for caution in interpreting my results on labor market returns,
as differences between academic and vocational returns may emerge later in working
careers.
The notion of vocational schooling as safety valve or sinkhole has been discussed in
previous literature. Arum and Shavit (1995) consider whether vocational schooling in the
United States “is simply the crude mechanism of social exclusion” (i.e., a sinkhole), but
conclude that “vocational education is a safety net that reduces the risk of falling to the
bottom of the labor queue” (p. 187). For South Africa, Needham and Papier (2011) refer
to a stigma attached to vocational schooling, and the common perception that it is a sink-
hole: “Some school [general education] students saw FET college [Further Education and
Training, or vocational secondary] education as a second choice education that would
result in low-paying jobs with no career prospects” (p. 36). They also reference vocational
schooling’s safety valve role, citing qualitative evidence of poor previous schooling out-
comes among vocational students: “[S]tudents viewed vocational education, particularly
FET colleges, as second chance programmes that you went to if you could not make it at
[traditional] school” (p. 37)3. This paper contributes to the literature by formalizing the
safety valve and sinkhole concepts in a human capital investment model, documenting
the patterns of differential selection into vocational and academic schooling in South
Africa, and estimating the wage and employment returns to each type of schooling. These
returns estimates, while observational in nature, use high-quality panel data that include
complete schooling histories, measures of ability, and actual (rather than potential) work
experience, allowing for bias reductions relative to similar estimates from a census or
labor force survey.
In the next section, I define the terms “safety valve” and “sinkhole” in a simple model of
human capital investment. Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics.
Section 4 analyzes the role of vocational schooling in youth enrollment choices and labor
market outcomes, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Safety valves and sinkholes
Consider a generalization of the standard Becker (1967)/Mincer (1974) human capital
model in which agents may choose between two types of schooling, academic (a) and
vocational (v). Students may invest in one type of schooling only, both, or neither4. Each
schooling type has associated return and cost functions, Rj(·) and Cj(·), for schooling
types j = {a, v}. The cost functions are general and include both themonetary and psychic
costs of schooling. These return and cost functions depend on the type-specific stock of
schooling Sj, the agent’s ability A, and exogenous shifters Z. As is standard, assume that
Rj is increasing and weakly concave in Sj and Cj is increasing and convex in Sj 5. Also
assume that Rj is increasing in A and Cj is decreasing in A: higher-ability individuals earn
higher returns and face lower costs at any level of schooling. The signs of Rj and Cj are
ambiguous with respect to Z.
I assume that schooling type v carries a fixed cost:
Cv(Sv,Ae,Z) = cv(Sv,Ae,Z|Sv > 0) + φ · I(Sv > 0) (1)
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where I(·) is the indicator function and φ is the fixed cost. The fixed cost φ stands in for
many features that distinguish vocational from academic schooling in the South African
context, such as the cost of acquiring information about vocational programs, greater
travel distance, an application fee, or non-pecuniary costs such as a stigma for attending
a type v school.
The agent’s lifetime, discounted income Y is the sum of the schooling return functions:
Y = Ra(Sa,A,Z)+Rv(Sv,A,Z). The agent observes his or her own ability imperfectly, and
must base decisions on its expectation Ae. The agent’s optimization problem is then6:
max
Sa,Sv
V ={[Ra(Sa,Ae,Z) + Rv(Sv,Ae,Z)]
− [Ca(Sa,Ae,Z) + Cv(Sv,Ae,Z)]}
(2)





(Sj,Ae,Z) for j = a, v (3)
where the weak inequality allows for discrete increments of Sj and corner solutions. This
is the standard result that the agent invests in each type of schooling Sj to equate (as
closely as possible) its marginal benefits and costs. The fixed cost to schooling type v adds
the following participation constraint:
Y − cv(Sv,Ae,Z) ≥ φ (4)
The first order conditions in (3) and the participation constraint (4) implicitly define
the optimal levels of schooling S∗j = Sj(Ae,Z). If there is heterogeneity in the population
in the fixed cost φ, the first result is that there exists a threshold φ∗ above which the agent
will choose not to acquire any type v schooling.
Now consider comparative statics with respect to ability. Suppose the agent revises his














The first term inside brackets on the right-hand side of (5) is the (perceived) marginal
return resulting from the revision to expected ability, while the second term is the change
in schooling costs. The first term is positive and the second negative, making the sign of
the derivative unambiguously positive. This positive sign is intuitive: perceived returns
will fall when one revises expected ability downward after failing a grade, or rise with
gains in expected ability. Costs will rise in response to a failure, or decrease with a gain in
expected ability.
To see how the change in expected ability affects schooling choices, first define the







Although Aj is positive for both types of schooling, it need not be equivalent across
schooling types, and therefore the agent may alter schooling investments differentially
between types in order to satisfy the first-order conditions in (3). I refer to schooling type
v as a safety valve if |Aa | > |Av |: if this inequality holds, then schooling of type v is less
responsive to revisions in expected ability. This implies that students experiencing a grade
failure would be more likely to drop out of type a schooling than type v, or switch from
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a to v than from v to a. Because of discrete increments of Sj and the possibility of corner
solutions, we may observe no change in either type of schooling; those whose fixed cost
of type v schooling (φ) is sufficiently high will continue to abstain from investing in type v
schooling. However, we are more likely to observe no change in the safety valve schooling
type v than in a.
The safety valve result applies equally to external shocks Z: schooling type v would also
exhibit the safety valve property if |Za | > |Zv |, so that schooling type v would be less
responsive to shocks than type a. For negative shocks, such as the death or job loss of a
household member, the safety valve schooling option would offer a more forgiving course
of study, making the student less likely to drop out. For positive shocks, such as a gain
in household income, investment in the safety valve schooling type should also be less
responsive, because students whose household financial position is more secure are better
insured against failure in the less forgiving, non-safety valve schooling option.
The presence of a safety valve type of schooling is a boon for students experiencing
failure or negative shocks, as they can shift their schooling choices in favor of the relatively
less affected type (v in the running example). They do so until the first-order conditions
in (3) are satisfied, and the marginal benefits and marginal costs of each type of schooling
chosen return to equilibrium. Nonetheless, the presence of the safety valve may impose a
significant cost on students through inferior labor market returns, βj ≡ ∂Rj∂Sj , earned at the
new optimal schooling choices.
If these inferior returns are systematic, i.e., if βv < βa for all Sv = Sa, then it would be
evidence that vocational schooling is a sinkhole, consistent with the concerns expressed
by its graduates in Section 1. That is, if schooling type v generates lower labor market
returns than type a at comparable schooling levels, it is a sinkhole, because students must
pay for the lower costs (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) of this type of schooling in terms of
labor market performance7. In other words, a sinkhole schooling type draws in students
with low costs, but fails to offer competitive returns on the labor market8.
2.2 Empirical implementation
In this paper, I investigate the hypothesis that vocational schooling acts as a safety valve
for South African youth, as well as the hypothesis that it is a sinkhole with respect to its
labor market returns. To test the safety valve hypothesis, I seek evidence that enrollment
in vocational schooling responds less than academic schooling to revisions of expected
ability and external shocks. To do so, I run variations of the following regression:
Djit = αj0 + αjf Fit + αjzZit + γ jXit + jit (7)
where j = {a, v} indexes academic schooling a and vocational schooling v; i indexes indi-
viduals; and t indexes time periods. The outcome variableDj is an indicator for enrollment
in schooling type j; F is a vector of grade failure history; Z is a vector of external shocks;
X is a vector of additional controls, which may include fixed effects for individual, age,
schooling level, and calendar year, as well as other control variables; and  is an error term.
In this regression, grade failure history variables F proxy for revisions to expected ability,
making the coefficient αjf analogous to Aj in the model of Section 2.1. Individual fixed
effects will capture a student’s prior expected ability, while age and completed schooling
terms will capture average ability expectations associated with those variables, allowing
the failure terms to isolate changes in expected ability. Comparing the coefficients αvf and
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αaf therefore provides a test of the safety valve hypothesis: if vocational schooling is a
safety valve, I should find that αaf < αvf < 0.
Similarly, the safety valve hypothesis suggests that vocational enrollment should be less
responsive to external shocks Z, i.e., |αaz | > |αvz |. Due to data limitations that I will explain
in the following sections, I will run variations of the safety valve regression (7) on subsets
of the failure and shock variables F and Z.
To test whether vocational schooling is a sinkhole, I run a variant of the standardMincer
regression:
Yit = β0 + βaSait + βvSvit + γXit + it (8)
where Y is a labor market outcome (employment or log wages); Sa and Sv are the stock
of academic and vocational schooling, respectively; and all other notation is as before.
This model assumes that the type-specific schooling return functions Rj(·) are linear in
Sj, leading to the extension of the standard Mincer regression of (log) wages on years of
each type of schooling shown above. I address the limitations of Mincer regressions in the
empirical setting of this paper in Section 4.
3 Data
Vocational schooling is available to South African students beginning in Grade 10,
when schooling is no longer compulsory. Students opting for a vocational program
may enroll in technical schools in Grades 10-12 (also known as FET colleges, for Fur-
ther Education and Training) or National Technical Certificate (NTC) programs at
equivalent grade levels. Such programs tend to focus on preparing students for skilled
trades and service professions, such as metal and electrical work, plumbing, and hos-
pitality. At the post-secondary level, students with sufficiently high scores on the high
school exit (“matric”) exam may qualify for admission to public universities. Such
universities include traditional academically oriented institutions and universities of
technology (formerly known as Technikons). Although academic universities and uni-
versities of technology have some overlap in courses of study offered, the universities
of technology focus more on trade and professional skills than their academic counter-
parts, offering accounting, teacher training, design, nursing, health services and other
subjects.
I define “vocational” and “academic” schooling as mutually exclusive categories within a
year of enrollment, although students may switch between them across years. Vocational
schooling includes enrollment in a National Technical Certificate program (such as an
FET college) or university of technology; enrollment in all other programs is academic
schooling. Private higher education institutions are also available at the post-secondary
level. Although such institutions may offer both academic or vocational courses of study,
I consider them academically oriented institutions because I am unable to distinguish
what course of study a particular student chooses. Because employment while enrolled in
school is rare in South Africa, I treat school enrollment and labor market participation as
mutually exclusive activities9.
Vocational secondary and post-secondary programs have distinct requirements and
attract different students. Nonetheless, they have a shared focus on training students in
a narrow set of occupation-specific skills (e.g., welding and plumbing in secondary, nurs-
ing and tourism management in post-secondary), whereas academic programs tend to
2014, 3:8
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focus on more general skills. In the analysis presented in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.3, I will
probe robustness of the key results of the paper to separating each type of schooling into
secondary and post-secondary levels.
I use data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS), a longitudinal study of youth in
metropolitan Cape Town, South Africa (Lam et al. 2008). CAPS sampled about 4,800
youth aged 14-22 in Wave 1 (2002) and currently includes five publicly available waves
with the most recent conducted in 2009. In Wave 1, retrospective life histories were
collected for each year stretching back to birth, and include information on school enroll-
ment and advancement, job search, and employment. I update this retrospective life
history data with information from Waves 2-5 to construct the panel used in this paper.
I make several sample restrictions. I drop white youth, as they tend to enjoy living stan-
dards comparable to those in developed countries, while my focus here is on youth who
tend to face high uncertainty in their schooling and employment outcomes. I keep only
those youth observed until at least age 18. I also drop those with inconsistent schooling
histories (details described in Appendix A), leaving 2,927 individuals in the sample. In
the analysis, I use only those person-years with at least 9 years of completed schooling, at
which point enrollment in vocational schooling becomes a viable option10. The resulting
dataset includes 23,997 person-year observations.
Table 1 shows the panel balance at selected ages, conditional on vocational enrollment
history. The sample size drops sharply at later ages due to both the young ages of entry into
the panel (i.e., right-censoring) and attrition in later waves. There is evidence of selective
censoring and attrition by vocational enrollment status, with vocational enrollees leaving
the sample at lower rates than those who never enter a vocational program, arguing for
caution when interpreting my results. However, the direction of the potential bias result-
ing from selective attrition is unclear: if vocational enrollees were both less successful on
the labor market than others (i.e., the sinkhole hypothesis) and more likely to leave the
sample as a result, then we would expect to see the opposite pattern of attrition than the
one observed.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample. Panel A presents characteristics
by individual, while Panel B describes the person-year observations used in the panel
estimation I conduct in Section 4. Coloured11 youth make up almost two thirds of the
(weighted) sample and black/Africans the remainder, as is characteristic of metropolitan
Cape Town. Only 9% of the sample ever enrolls in a vocational program, with a nearly
even split between secondary and post-secondary enrollees. Such small proportions are
Table 1 Panel attrition, by vocational enrollment history
Proportion censored at age
N 18 20 22 24 26 28
Full sample 2,927 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.57 0.77 0.92
vocational enrollment
Never 2,663 0.00 0.08 0.34 0.58 0.78 0.92
Any 264 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.51 0.69 0.92
Secondary 118 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.50 0.67 0.89
Post-secondary 149 0.00 0.05 0.19 0.52 0.72 0.94
Cells show number of observations (unweighted) or percent of sample (weighted) with missing enrollment information by
age. Sample drawn from CAPS life history data: black and coloured young adults observed until at least age 18 with valid












Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable N Mean S.D. Variable N Mean S.D.
Panel A: individuals Panel B: person-years
Female 2,927 0.55 0.50 Enrollment
Black 2,927 0.35 0.48 Academic 23,997 0.37 0.48
Coloured 2,927 0.65 0.48 Vocational 23,997 0.02 0.14
Age, Wave 1 2,927 18.1 2.4 Wage 3,840 27,183 21,090
Literacy and numeracy z-score 2,927 -0.10 0.83 Employed 14,454 0.25 0.44
Ever enrolled in: Formal job acquisition 1,297 0.28 0.45
Any vocational 2,927 0.09 0.29 Failed last grade
Vocational secondary 2,927 0.04 0.20 Any program 23,997 0.30 0.46
Vocational post-secondary 2,927 0.05 0.23 Academic 23,997 0.29 0.46
Completed schooling (years), conditional on enrollment: Vocational 23,997 0.01 0.10
All schooling 2,927 11.4 1.6 Previous grades failed
Academic 2,927 11.3 1.6 Any program 23,997 0.63 0.86
Any vocational 264 0.8 0.8 Academic 23,997 0.62 0.85
Vocational secondary 118 0.2 0.5 Vocational 23,997 0.00 0.06
Vocational post-secondary 149 0.8 0.9 Not employed last period 23,997 0.86 0.34
Vocational enrollees ever enrolled in: Previous periods employed 23,997 0.42 0.94
Academic secondary 118 0.97 0.17 Household shocks
Academic post-secondary 149 0.39 0.49 All 2,015 0.16 0.37
Health 2,015 0.09 0.28
Financial 2,015 0.08 0.28
Pension-eligible grandmother 23,997 0.13 0.33
Pension-eligible grandfather 23,997 0.04 0.20
Pregnancy 14,053 0.02 0.15
Marriage 14,053 0.01 0.11
Sample drawn from CAPS life history data: black and coloured young adults observed until at least age 18 with valid schooling histories. Other sample restrictions described in Appendix A. Vocational secondary includes
technical colleges and National Training Certificate (NTC) programs. Literacy and numeracy z-score is age-adjusted based on standardized test administered to all respondents in Wave 1. Vocational post-secondary includes
universities of technology. Wage is annualized full-time equivalent based on 160 hours/month, denominated in constant South African rand (base year 2002). Wage refers to “typical” earnings on current jobs held among
those not enrolled in school, regardless of current employment status. Employment restricted to periods when not enrolled in school. Formal method of job acquisition refers to responding to ad, sending CV, visiting firm, or
using employment agency. Household shocks include death; serious illness or injury; job loss; major financial loss (including business failure or bankruptcy); abandonment or divorce; theft, fire or property damage; or other
shock. Health shocks include death, serious illness, or injury. Financial shocks include job loss or major financial loss. “Pension-eligible grand(mother/father)” refers to co-residence with grandmother at least 60 years old or
grandfather at least 65 years old, respectively. Marriage refers to event, not marital status. Marriage refers to event, not marital status. Marriage and pregnancy statistics for females only. Excludes person-years corresponding
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consistent with the presence of a fixed cost to vocational schooling, as in the model of
Section 2.112. Those who enroll in vocational programs complete 0.8 years of study, on
average.
Among vocational secondary students, 97% have also enrolled in an academic sec-
ondary program (grades 10-12) at some point in their careers, while 39% of vocational
post-secondary students have also been enrolled in an academic post-secondary pro-
gram. This stands in contrast to many vocational systems, such as those in Europe,
in which schooling tracks are rigidly defined and switching is difficult or impossible.
By contrast, South African vocational students often arrive in their programs through
experimentation and switching. Such behavior also generates useful identifying vari-
ation for the Mincer regressions based on (8) that I will use to test the sinkhole
hypothesis.
Turning to the person-year characteristics in Panel B, we see that the enrollment
rate in academic programs is far higher than in vocational (37% to 2%). Among
the employed, mean wages (annualized full-time equivalent) are R27,183, or about
USD2,567. Grade failure is quite prevalent, with 30% of person-year observations hav-
ing failed their last grade enrolled. Household shocks are also common, with a frequency
of 16%.
Table 3 presents enrollment rates by selected characteristics. Gender and racial differ-
ences in enrollment are modest. Although we saw in Table 2 that the overall enrollment
Table 3 Vocational enrollment, by selected characteristics
Ever enrolled in vocational:
N Any Secondary Post-secondary
Male 1,227 0.10 0.04 0.06
Female 1,700 0.09 0.04 0.05
Race
Black 1,522 0.09 0.04 0.05
Coloured 1,405 0.10 0.04 0.06
Household income
Poorest two quintiles 1,564 0.06 0.04 0.03
Richest three quintiles 1,363 0.12 0.04 0.07
Schooling
9-11 years 1,602 0.03 0.03 0.00
12 years 840 0.13 0.08 0.06
> 12 years 485 0.21 0.01 0.20
Ability
Low 1,809 0.06 0.04 0.02
High 1,118 0.13 0.04 0.10
Re-enrollment history
Never 1,528 0.05 0.02 0.04
At least once 1,399 0.14 0.07 0.08
At least once 1,097 0.12 0.09 0.04
Before completing secondary
Sample drawn from CAPS life history data: black and coloured young adults observed until at least age 18 with valid
schooling histories. Other sample restrictions described in Appendix A. Excludes person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for
which fraudulent fieldwork suspected. Sample sizes are raw counts, with survey-weighted means reported in remaining
columns. Vocational secondary includes technical colleges and National Training Certificate (NTC) programs. Vocational
post-secondary includes universities of technology. “High ability” refers to scoring above full sample age-adjusted median
score on literacy and numeracy evaluation administered in Wave 1. Household income quintiles based on Wave 1 data.
2014, 3:8
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/8
Pugatch IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 10 of 31
rate for vocational programs was relatively low, in Table 3 we see that enrollees in voca-
tional secondary programs come from across the income distribution, while vocational
post-secondary students tend to be from wealthier backgrounds. Vocational students are
also highly educated: 20% of those with more than 12 years of schooling have enrolled
in a vocational program. The bulk of this group are enrollees in a post-secondary voca-
tional program (i.e., a university of technology); only 1% of those with more than 12 years
of schooling ever enrolled in a vocational secondary program. Vocational enrollment fol-
lows a similar pattern with respect to the ability distribution: the highly able choose to
enroll in vocational post-secondary more than the less able, where high ability refers to
scoring above the full sample, age-adjusted median on the literacy and numeracy evalu-
ation administered in CAPS Wave 1. Vocational enrollment also exhibits an interesting
pattern with respect to student re-enrollment histories. Vocational enrollment is low (just
5%) among those who never re-enrolled, i.e., those who never interrupt their studies with
a period of dropout. But vocational enrollment rises to 14% among those who re-enroll at
least once in their schooling career, with this activity split equally between secondary and
post-secondary vocational programs. Enrollment in vocational secondary programs is 9%
among those who re-enroll before completing secondary, compared to an overall voca-
tional secondary enrollment rate of 4%. The disproportionate prevalence of re-enrollees
among vocational students suggests that these programs attract many “second-chance”
students who left the traditional academic system. This descriptive evidence is consistent
with the safety valve role of vocational schooling, but remains to be verified in the formal
analysis.
4 Results
4.1 Testing the safety valve hypothesis
4.1.1 Do struggling students select into vocational schooling?
If vocational schooling is a safety valve, it would drive away a smaller share of students
who struggle in school. Table 4 shows results of regressions (linear probability mod-
els) of enrollment in academic or vocational schooling on measures of grade failure and
unemployment. All regressions include individual fixed effects and a full set of completed
schooling, age and calendar year dummies, so that identification is achieved through
variation in school or labor market outcomes that is uncorrelated with time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, including ability or motivation to the extent these are perma-
nent characteristics; factors common to youth at particular ages or levels of schooling; or
macroeconomic conditions13. The identification strategy is thus similar to the “schooling
as a lottery” idea of Lam et al. (2011), in which school performance depends on innate
characteristics and idiosyncratic stochastic shocks14.
Panel A of Table 4 presents results for the full sample. In column (1), I find that students
who failed their last grade are 40 percentage points less likely to enroll in an academic pro-
gram. Each previous failure (prior to the result of the last grade) results in an additional
17 percentage point decline in the probability of enrollment in an academic program.
Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The analogous regression for
vocational enrollment in column (3) shows that students who failed their last grade are
only 1 percentage point less likely to enroll in vocational schooling, with significance at
10%. The differential response of academic and vocational enrollment to grade failure is












Table 4 Enrollment response to grade failure and previous employment, by program type
(1) (2) diff. (3) (4) diff.
Panel A: full sample Academic (3)-(1) Vocational (4)-(2)
Failed last grade enrolled -0.40 -0.39 *** -0.01 -0.01 ***
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.005)* (0.005)*
Previous grades failed -0.17 -0.17 *** 0.004 0.004 ***
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.004) (0.004)
Not employed last period 0.07 0.02 ***
(0.01)*** (0.004)***
Observations 23,997 23,997 23,997 23,997
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.26 0.26
No. individuals 2,927 2,927 2,927 2,927
Includes work experience x x
Panel B: by level Secondary diff. Post-secondary diff.
Academic Vocational (2)-(1) Academic Vocational (4)-(3)
Failed last grade enrolled -0.44 -0.02 *** -0.27 -0.16
(0.01)*** (0.005)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)***
Previous grades failed -0.22 0.01 *** -0.41 -0.12 ***
(0.01)*** (0.01) (0.09)*** (0.06)**
Observations 17,023 17,023 6,974 6,974
R-squared 0.77 0.32 0.60 0.49
No. individuals 2,927 2,927 1,325 1,325
Panel C: by previous period choice Dropout only diff. Re-enrollment only diff.
Academic Vocational (2)-(1) Academic Vocational (4)-(3)
Failed last grade enrolled -0.38 -0.01 *** -0.38 -0.06 ***
(0.02)*** (0.01) (0.03)*** (0.02)***
Previous grades failed -0.14 0.00 *** -0.39 -0.03 ***
















Table 4 Enrollment response to grade failure and previous employment, by program type (Continued)
Observations 11,914 11,914 12,083 12,083
R-squared 0.65 0.35 0.69 0.38
No. individuals 2,912 2,912 2,702 2,702
Panel D: by program of last enrollment Last enrollment: academic diff. Last enrollment: vocational diff.
Academic Vocational (2)-(1) Academic Vocational (4)-(3)
Failed last grade enrolled -0.42 -0.01 *** 0.03 -0.43 ***
(0.01)*** (0.003)** (0.07) (0.13)***
Previous grades failed -0.18 0.003 *** 0.003 -0.25 *
(0.01)*** (0.004) (0.03) (0.17)
Observations 23,120 23,120 877 877
R-squared 0.71 0.22 0.65 0.75
No. individuals 2,927 2,927 245 245
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Sample is person-years from estimation sample (sample selection criteria described in Appendix A),
with completed education 9 years or more, from CAPS life history panel. Excludes person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for which fraudulent fieldwork suspected. All regressions are survey-weighted linear probability
models that include individual fixed effects and age, completed schooling, and calendar year dummies. Work experience variables include dummy for non-employment in last period of non-enrollment and cumulative work
experience. Vocational programs include technical colleges, NTC and universities of technology. Secondary and post-secondary refer to person-years with completed schooling corresponding to indicated level. Dropout
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37% and 2%, respectively, as reported in Table 2, Panel B)15. The difference between coef-
ficients across models is also statistically significant for both recent and previous grade
failure16. This is strong evidence in favor of the safety valve role for vocational school-
ing: struggling students are deterred from enrollment in academic programs but are not
similarly deterred from vocational programs. Columns (2) and (4) add work history to
the regressions to check if differential employment opportunities are driving the results,
but there is almost no change in the failure coefficients. I find that non-employment in
the previous period out of school increases the likelihood of enrollment in both academic
and vocational programs, but by a greater amount (7 percentage points to 2) for academic
programs. Thus schooling of both types serve a safety valve function for youth who were
unsuccessful in the labor market.
Panel B splits the sample between secondary and post-secondary levels, to explore
whether the safety valve role is driven by one level only. I omit work experience vari-
ables from these and all subsequent regressions in the table for simplicity, although their
inclusion leaves the grade failure coefficients almost unchanged. For secondary school-
ing (columns 1-2), the safety valve results are repeated with similar magnitudes as for
the full sample, with a 44 percentage point decline in academic enrollment in response
to grade failure compared to a 2 percentage point decline for vocational. Moreover, each
previous grade failed leads to a 22 percentage point decrease in academic secondary
enrollment, versus no significant change for vocational. For post-secondary schooling,
academic enrollment is also more responsive to grade failure than vocational enrollment,
although here the discrepancy is statistically significant only for previous grades failed.
The contrasting results probably arise because academic and vocational post-secondary
programs are more similar to each other in entrance requirements and rigor than are
secondary programs. Nonetheless, the safety role of vocational schooling exists to some
extent at both levels.
In Panel C, I examine enrollment choices separately by last enrollment status. Columns
(1)-(2) condition on enrollment in the previous period, so that non-enrollment repre-
sents dropping out of the program. Columns (3)-(4) condition on non-enrollment in the
previous period, so that the outcome is re-enrollment following dropout. Again I find
strong support for the safety valve hypothesis. Grade failure leads to dropout from an aca-
demic program, with similar magnitudes to those from the full sample. However, grade
failure does not result in dropout from vocational programs. Analysis of re-enrollment
yields qualitatively similar results: struggling students are much less likely to re-enroll in
academic programs, with the coefficient on previous failure even larger than for the full
sample. Grade failure is now a significant negative predictor of re-enrollment in voca-
tional schooling, but the coefficients are less than one-sixth the magnitude of those for
academic schooling.
I analyze enrollment transitions within and between programs in Panel D by condi-
tioning on the type of program in which a student was last enrolled. In columns (1)-(2),
students whose last enrollment was in an academic program respond to grade failure in
much the same manner as the full sample, further strengthening the safety valve hypoth-
esis. In column (4), however, students whose last enrollment was in a vocational program
are deterred from enrollment in vocational programs in response to grade failure to a
similar extent as the analogous results for academic programs in column (1). This result
reveals a limitation of the safety valve role for vocational schooling: it offers a welcoming
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environment for students who struggle in the academic system, but students who struggle
within the vocational system tend not to continue.
One concern with the results presented in Table 4 is that they treat all grade failure as
equivalent regardless of schooling type. Instead, failure in an academic programmay send
a different signal than failure in a vocational program. I address this possibility, as well
as other potential shortcomings in the baseline specification, in the robustness checks
presented in Section 4.3.
4.1.2 Do students experiencing shocks or forming households select into vocational
schooling?
Another way in which vocational schooling could serve as a safety valve is by deterring
fewer students who experience negative household shocks, such as a household mem-
ber’s job loss or death. However, in regressions (linear probability models) of academic or
vocational enrollment on indicators of contemporaneous and lagged negative household
shocks, such shocks do not lead to significant changes in either academic or vocational
enrollment. This is true for shocks of all types and separately for health and financial
shocks. For positive shocks like an increase in household income, youth might respond
by choosing vocational schooling less frequently because its safety valve function is less
necessary. Following the literature that finds that public pension receipt in South Africa
influences decisions by other household members (Case 2004; Duflo 2003; Edmonds
2006; Souza 2010), I used a regression discontinuity design that specifies enrollment as a
function of a grandmother or grandfather’s pension eligibility and a polynomial in grand-
parent ages. I found no statistically significant association between household pension
eligibility and enrollment in either academic or vocational programs. Results of both these
exercises are omitted for brevity but available upon request.
Despite this lack of clear evidence on the safety valve role of vocational schooling in
response to household shocks, the results of Table 4 are highly robust to the inclusion
of household shocks as controls. Table A1 presents results, in which the baseline spec-
ification of column (1) is augmented with inclusion of the shocks considered above in
columns (2)-(8). Coefficients remain stable, with significant differences between aca-
demic and vocational enrollment throughout, suggesting that it is revisions to expected
ability resulting from grade failure, and not shocks, that drive the safety valve result.
In addition to negative shocks, household formation can lead to interruptions in
human capital investment, making it more difficult for students, particularly women,
who choose to marry or have children to succeed in the labor market. Vocational
schooling could also serve as a safety valve by being particularly welcoming to female stu-
dents who are expanding their families. I explore this possibility in Table 5 by limiting
the sample to females and regressing academic or vocational enrollment on pregnancy
and marriage events (i.e., getting married rather than marital status) and their lags,
along with individual fixed effects, and dummies for age, completed schooling, and
calendar year.
In column (1) of Table 5, I find that females who become pregnant are 9 percentage
points less likely to enroll in academic programs in the year of the pregnancy, and 12 per-
centage points less likely the year following pregnancy, with coefficients significant at the
1% level. By contrast, in column (2) I find corresponding declines in vocational enrollment
of just 1 percentage point each, with statistical significance only for lagged pregnancy. The
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Table 5 Female enrollment and household formation, by program type
Dropout only Re-enrollment only
Program type Academic Vocational Academic Vocational Academic Vocational
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pregnancy -0.09 -0.01 -0.18 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03)*** (0.01) (0.05)*** (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Pregnancy (t − 1) -0.12 -0.01 -0.31 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.03)*** (0.004)*** (0.06)*** (0.01)* (0.02) (0.01)**
Marriage -0.04 0.004 -0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.16) (0.08) (0.01) (0.004)
Marriage (t − 1) 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03)** (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 14,053 14,053 7,071 7,071 6,982 6,982
R-squared 0.65 0.24 0.60 0.33 0.64 0.38
No. individuals 1,700 1,700 1,692 1,692 1,567 1,567
p-value of difference
Pregnancy 0.00 0.00 0.96
Pregnancy (t − 1) 0.00 0.00 0.52
Marriage 0.16 0.52 0.15
Marriage (t − 1) 0.13 0.35 0.96
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Sample is person-years from estimation sample described in Appendix A, females only, with completed education 9 years or
more, from CAPS life history panel. Excludes person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for which fraudulent fieldwork
suspected. All regressions are survey-weighted linear probability models that include individual fixed effects and age,
completed schooling, and calendar year dummies. Vocational programs include technical colleges, NTC and universities of
technology. Dropout refers to non-enrollment following a period of enrollment. Re-enrollment refers to enrollment after at
least one year of non-enrollment.
coefficients on pregnancy differ significantly from each other between themodels for aca-
demic and vocational enrollment. Thus I find that pregnancy is associated with schooling
interruptions, but much less so in vocational than academic programs. The only marriage
coefficient that is significant is lagged marriage in column (1), which is associated with a 6
percentage point increase in academic enrollment. These patterns are broadly consistent
with a safety valve role for vocational schooling among females who are forming house-
holds, although recently married women are also comfortable in the traditional academic
system. Decomposing the results by dropout and re-enrollment choices in columns (3)-
(6), I find that the results are driven by dropout behavior. This is an important result, as
vocational schooling appears to allow pregnant girls fewer interruptions in their studies
than academic schooling. Enrollment, marriage and fertility are often decided simultane-
ously, of course, so I hesitate to interpret the coefficient estimates causally. However, the
results do answer whether enrollment and household formation decisions differ by type
of schooling, thereby offering further insight into the safety valve hypothesis17.
4.2 Testing the sinkhole hypothesis
Although I have found evidence supportive of the safety valve hypothesis for vocational
schooling, a natural follow-up question is whether vocational schooling facilitates good
subsequent outcomes for its students. Even if vocational schooling is a safety valve for
those currently enrolled, is it a sinkhole when it comes to labor market returns?
Table 6 presents results of regressions estimating the wage and employment returns
to schooling, differentiated by type of program (academic or vocational) and level (sec-
ondary or post-secondary). These are variations on standard Mincer regressions, and
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Table 6 Labor market outcomes and schooling type
(Log) wages Employment







Academic secondary 0.08 0.04
(0.01)*** (0.004)***
Academic post-secondary 0.13 0.11
(0.03)*** (0.01)***
Vocational secondary 0.06 0.02
(0.10) (0.05)
Vocational post-secondary 0.16 0.19
(0.08)** (0.05)***
Observations 3,840 3,840 3,840 14,454 14,454 14,454
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.22
No. individuals 1,676 1,676 1,676 2,811 2,811 2,811
H0: academic=vocational 0.69 0.09
H0: academic=vocational (secondary) 0.80 0.79
H0: academic=vocational (post-secondary) 0.74 0.10
U/O: schooling 3.8 -4.5
U/O: academic 3.9 -4.6
U/O: vocational 1.8 -2.9
U/O: academic secondary 2.7 13.5
U/O: academic post-secondary -6.2 -1.5
U/O: vocational secondary 0.3 2.1
U/O: vocational post-secondary -1.3 -2.0
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Unit of observation is person-year. Sample restricted to person-years with at least 9 years completed schooling and not
currently enrolled. Wages are log of monthly full-time equivalent wages based on 160 hours/month. Wages refer to
self-reported earnings on current or most recent jobs held among those not enrolled in school, regardless of current
employment status, FTE based on 160 hours worked/month. Employment restricted to periods when not enrolled in school.
Excludes person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for which fraudulent fieldwork suspected. All regressions include race,
gender, and calendar year dummies; and controls for age-adjusted LNE z-score, experience, experience squared, age, and
age squared. Vocational schooling includes NTC and other technical secondary, and universities of technology. Reported
test statistics are p-values of indicated null hypothesis. U/O ratio: ratio of selection on unobservables/observables required
to explain away effect of schooling variable on outcome, obtained as βC
βNC−βC , where βC is schooling coefficient frommodel
with included controls and βNC is schooling coefficient frommodel without controls. Controls as indicated and described
above. See Appendix B for details. Survey weights applied.
therefore come with the usual caveats against a causal interpretation of coefficients.
Indeed, in the preceding sections I have documented the dimensions of self-selection
into academic and vocational schooling. However, to the extent that the previous results
show that vocational students are adversely selected relative to their peers in academic
programs, it would be especially notable to find high Mincerian returns to vocational
schooling.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 6 present regressions of log wages on years of schooling.
When scaled by 100, coefficients represent the approximate percentage return to an addi-
tional year of schooling. Because the sample includes only those person-years with at
least 9 years schooling and not currently enrolled, the estimated returns refer to school-
ing beyond the compulsory level, when vocational schooling becomes an option. Data
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on wages were collected only in Waves 1-5, resulting in far smaller sample sizes than the
safety valve regressions that use life history data. Regressions also include age-adjusted
literacy and numeracy z-score; work experience, age and their squares; and race, gen-
der, and calendar year dummies. The inclusion of an ability proxy and actual (rather than
potential) work experience allow for bias reductions relative to results from a census
or labor force survey, which typically lack such measures. Column (1) is the canoni-
cal Mincer regression of log wages on overall years of schooling and these controls.
I find that each additional year of schooling correlates with wage gains of 9 percent.
Column (2) distinguishes between academic and vocational schooling, with vocational
returns of 10 percent versus 9 percent for academic; the p-value on the difference
is 0.69.
Column (3) further distinguishes each type of schooling by level (primary/secondary
and post-secondary for academic, secondary and post-secondary for vocational). Within
each type of schooling, returns are larger in post-secondary than secondary, consistent
with earlier evidence on the convexity of returns to schooling in South Africa (Case and
Yogo 1999). The point estimate for vocational secondary returns is both lower than its
academic counterpart (6% to 8%) and imprecisely estimated. The return to vocational
post-secondary exceeds that for academic post-secondary, 16% to 13%, and is statistically
significant at 5%. In neither case are the within-level academic and vocational coefficients
significantly different from each other. This suggests that the estimated return for voca-
tional secondary is hampered by lack of statistical power, rather than being a precisely
estimated zero. The results show no clear advantage for academic schooling compared to
vocational, contrary to the sinkhole hypothesis. The absence of evidence in favor of the
sinkhole hypothesis, though not conclusive, is striking because the potentially negative
selection into vocational schooling found in the preceding sections of the paper should
lead to downward bias in estimates of vocational returns.
The obvious concern with these results is that students may select into levels and types
of schooling based on unobserved attributes, leading to inconsistent estimates of school-
ing returns. To assess the importance of this concern, I examine whether estimates of
returns vary substantially when excluding the control variables mentioned above. If these
controls help to mitigate bias due to omitted ability or other unobserved characteris-
tics, then finding similar returns to schooling regardless of their inclusion suggests that
any remaining omitted variable bias is likely to be small. On the other hand, if estimated
returns attenuate substantially upon including the controls, then one has more cause to
worry that selection on unobservables drives the results.
To formalize this idea, I follow Altonji et al. (2005) in calculating the ratio of selection on
unobservables to selection on observables required to explain away the entire estimated
returns for each schooling measure18. A ratio greater than one in absolute value indicates
that the covariance between unobserved characteristics and schooling must exceed the
covariance between included control variables and schooling to explain away the entire
return. A negative ratio indicates that the schooling coefficient estimated with controls
increases relative to the coefficient estimated without controls, a surprising result if we
expect the controls to proxy for (upward) ability bias. Altonji et al. (2005) interpret ratios
greater than three as large, and ratios greater than one as indicative of a non-zero treat-
ment effect even in the presence of selection on unobservables. I report this ratio for each
coefficient as “U/O” in Table 6. Details of the procedure are in Appendix B.
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Given the high-quality data of the panel, I expect the included controls to account for
much of the selection into schooling, and the results in Table 6 support this claim. In
column (2), I find U/O ratios of 3.9 and 1.8 for academic and vocational schooling, respec-
tively, indicating that selection on unobservables is unlikely to be so large as to explain
away these coefficients. In column (3), only the ratio for the vocational secondary coeffi-
cient is less than one in absolute value, which is not surprising given that this coefficient
is not statistically different from zero. The negative U/O ratios for academic and voca-
tional post-secondary reflect increases in these coefficients relative to their counterparts
estimated without control variables.
Columns (4)-(6) show regressions analogous to the first three columns, but with
employment as the outcome19. As these are linear probability models, coefficients (scaled
by 100) may be interpreted as percentage point changes in the likelihood of employ-
ment for an additional year of schooling. In column (4), I find the employment return
to schooling is 5 percentage points. In column (5), I find that the employment return
to vocational schooling is 10 percentage points versus 5 percentage points for aca-
demic schooling, with the p-value of the difference equal to 0.09. When differentiating
schooling by level, I find larger returns to post-secondary than secondary schooling
within each type of program. As with wages, for employment the point estimate for
post-secondary vocational exceeds that for academic while the opposite is true for sec-
ondary, although the coefficients are not significantly different from each other. All of
the U/O ratios in columns (4)-(6) exceed one in absolute value, suggesting that selec-
tion on unobservables does not drive the results. As with wage returns, the sinkhole
hypothesis of systematically lower labor market returns for vocational schooling does
not find support in the data20. Due to lack of precision, I am unable to conclude that
wage and employment returns to vocational secondary schooling are strictly positive,
however.
In results not shown but available upon request, I have also allowed for non-
linearity in returns at particular levels of academic or vocational schooling by includ-
ing dummies for each completed grade of academic and vocational schooling in
the Mincer wage and employment regressions. Although grade level-specific point
estimates of academic returns exceed those of vocational for both (log) wages and
employment at some levels of schooling, the differences are never statistically signif-
icant. These results rule out the presence of differential “sheepskin effects” between
academic and vocational schooling, providing further evidence against the sinkhole
hypothesis.
Another way to gauge the importance of selection on unobservables is to restrict the
analysis of Table 6 to a subsample for whom the sinkhole hypothesis is likely to hold:
the negatively selected subsample of those who previously failed a grade. These results
(not shown but available upon request) are quite similar to those for the full sample, with
no significant differences between academic and vocational schooling coefficients with
either log wages or employment as the outcome.
An important caveat for all the labor market results, however, is that the sample is quite
young (with maximum age 29), so that the returns we observe correspond to early career
outcomes only. Academic schooling may provide general skills whose returns rise faster
than those of vocational skills over a worker’s lifetime, as shown for OECD countries in
Hanushek et al. (2011)21.
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4.3 Robustness checks
One might object that the model of Section 2 treats ability as uni-dimensional when in
fact students possess expectations about both their academic- and vocational-specific
abilities. If this is the case, then the safety valve regressions in Table 4 are misspeci-
fied. A straightforward extension of the model would allow for such multi-dimensional
ability (i.e., allowing academic- and vocational-specific expected abilities Aae and Ave ,
respectively) and modify the safety valve definition so that vocational enrollment is less
responsive to own-ability revisions than is academic enrollment22.
Table A2 presents regressions testing this extension of the model. In column (1), I
find that academic enrollment declines by 40 percentage points in response to a recent
academic failure, and an additional 18 percentage points for each previous academic
failure. Additionally, academic enrollment falls 9 percentage points in response to a
recent vocational failure, suggesting that students who fare poorly in either type of
program tend to leave academic schooling. Coefficients barely change when work expe-
rience controls are added in column (2). By contrast, in column (3) I find that although
vocational enrollment does decline in response to a recent vocational failure, the mag-
nitude (17 percentage points) is less than half that of a recent own-program failure in
column (1). Previous vocational failures have no statistically significant effect on voca-
tional enrollment. Moreover, each previous academic failure leads to a 1 percentage point
increase in vocational enrollment. Results are again robust to inclusion of work experi-
ence in column (4). Differences across models are significant only for academic failure
coefficients.
Next, I explore heterogeneity in the enrollment response of academic and vocational
schooling to grade failure in Table A3. Specifically, I regress enrollment on previous
schooling and labor market outcomes, analogous to columns (1) and (3) of Table 4, Panel
A, separately for students who attain secondary/post-secondary levels, males and females,
blacks and coloureds, and the bottom two/top three quintiles of household income.
Panel A of Table A3 shows the academic enrollment response, while Panel B shows the
vocational enrollment response.
In Panel A, columns (1)-(2), I split the sample by whether the student’s final attainment
is secondary or post-secondary, to explore whether students who achieve at different
levels respond to failure differently (note that this differs from Table 4, Panel B, which
splits the sample by secondary and post-secondary person-years; here I split the sam-
ple by individuals). I find that students who failed their last grade are less likely to enroll
in academic programs regardless of whether their eventual attainment is the secondary
or post-secondary level. The magnitude of this response is considerably higher for those
who stop at the secondary level: a 49 percentage point decline for secondary, compared to
16 percentage points for post-secondary. The discrepancy also appears in the coefficients
for previous grade failure. Looking at the same columns in Panel B, we see that students
who have failed are not similarly deterred from enrolling in vocational programs, with
only a 2 percentage point drop in vocational enrollment among those who stop at sec-
ondary schooling and no significant decline for students who go on to post-secondary.
The safety valve role of vocational programs exists for students who attain both major
levels of schooling.
In columns (3)-(8) of Table A3, I find similar patterns in the enrollment response to
failure across genders, races, and economic background: grade failure leads to sizable
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and statistically significant declines in academic enrollment, but little to no effect on
vocational enrollment. Within each subsample, differences between coefficients in the
academic and vocational enrollment equations are significant at the 1% level. Vocational
schooling is a safety valve for both males and females, blacks and coloureds, and youth
from the poorest and least poor households.
Given this robustness in the safety valve role of vocational schooling for enroll-
ment choices, it is also sensible to explore heterogeneity in labor market outcomes
among these subsamples. Table A4 presents Mincer regressions for wages and employ-
ment, respectively, analogous to columns (2) and (4) of Table 6, separately for black
and coloured youth. In columns (1)-(2) of Table A4, I find no significant differences
between wage returns for vocational and academic schooling for both black and coloured
youth. In columns (3)-(4), I find that vocational schooling generates larger employment
returns for youth of both races. For coloureds the difference is striking: an addi-
tional year of vocational schooling is associated with an 8 percentage point increase in
the probability of employment, more than one and a half times as large as an addi-
tional year of academic schooling (with the difference significant at 10%). For black
youth, vocational schooling does not appear to be a sinkhole—vocational wage and
employment returns are not significantly different from academic—but they do not reap
the employment gains accruing to coloureds. Selection on unobservables is unlikely
to explain any of these results: the ratio of selection on unobservables to observ-
ables required to explain away the schooling coefficients is often negative—indicating
that returns increase upon including observable characteristics—or otherwise greater
than one.
Given the importance of social networks in securing employment for South African
youth (Magruder 2010), one potential mechanism explaining this result is the greater
success enjoyed by coloured youth in using vocational schooling to acquire jobs through
formal means rather than informal networks23. If youth need credible evidence of skills
to access jobs through formal channels rather than relying on social networks, vocational
schooling might provide such a credential. In columns (5)-(6), I explore this possibil-
ity by regressing an indicator for job acquisition through formal channels (defined as
responding to a job advertisement, sending a CV, visiting a firm, or using an employ-
ment agency, as opposed to using informal social networks) on years of schooling of
each type among the sample of employed youth. Sample sizes drop substantially in these
regressions because information on search method is available only in the concurrent
waves of the panel, rather than in retrospective life histories, and because I restrict
the sample to employed youth in order to avoid conflating the employment returns
found in column (3)-(4) with the search method. The results reveal that the marginal
increase in success rates from formal search associated with academic schooling is sim-
ilar for black and coloured youth (6 versus 4 percentage points). However, each year
of vocational schooling is associated with a 22 percentage point increase in successful
formal search for coloured youth, compared to a 6 percentage point (though not sig-
nificant) decrease for blacks. Paired with the results from columns (3)-(4), this result
suggests that employers view black youth with vocational schooling less favorably than
otherwise similar coloureds when evaluating job candidates. Vocational schools cater-
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5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of vocational schooling in the school to work transition of
South African youth. I find evidence that vocational schooling acts as a safety valve for
students who struggle academically: grade failure leads to modest decreases in vocational
enrollment, compared to substantial declines in academic enrollment. Vocational school-
ing also serves as a safety valve for pregnant girls, in contrast to academic schooling, which
exhibits large enrollment declines following pregnancy. Household shocks have no statis-
tically significant effects on enrollment in either type of schooling, however. The safety
valve hypothesis is robust to allowing for multi-dimensional ability, with own-program
failure leading to smaller enrollment declines for vocational than academic schooling. The
results are present in both secondary and post-secondary schooling (although somewhat
muted for the latter) and persist across a number of subsamples of interest.
Given this evidence for the safety valve role for vocational schooling, one might
worry that an associated cost is lower labor market returns compared to academic
schooling, i.e., that vocational schooling is a sinkhole. Estimates of wage and employ-
ment returns fail to provide evidence for the sinkhole hypothesis, however. Returns
estimates for vocational secondary are hampered by lack of statistical power, but are
nonetheless positive and not statistically different from those for academic secondary.
Although I have shown that these estimated returns are unlikely to be explained away
by selection on unobserved characteristics, they come with the usual caveats against
the causal interpretation of Mincer regressions, and the additional caveat that the
relative returns may shift in favor of academic schooling as workers age (Hanushek
et al. 2011). Even so, the absence of evidence favoring academic schooling is notable in
this context, considering the low esteem South Africans hold for vocational schooling and
the evidence in this paper that its students are adversely selected.
If vocational schooling has the salutary effects that I find, particularly for struggling stu-
dents, why don’t more students enroll? At the post-secondary level, limited open seats and
relatively strict admissions requirements at universities of technology are likely barriers
to expanded enrollment. At the secondary level, qualitative evidence suggests that stigma
and information costs limit student enrollment in vocational programs, drawing students
who feel they have no other choice (Needham and Papier 2011). If this is the case, then
efforts by school administrators to promote vocational programs as a practical alternative
to the traditional system should yield benefits.
South African policymakers frequently express consternation about slow student pro-
gression through schools and high rates of youth unemployment, with economists finding
ample evidence to support such concerns. The evidence presented here suggests that
vocational schooling, a small and often overlooked educational institution, plays an
important role for vulnerable students both while they remain in school and when they
enter the labor market.
Endnotes
1Based on data for 15-24 year olds in 2005, compiled in Banerjee et al. (2008).
Unemployment follows the “narrow” definition of the International Labor Organization
(ILO), which classifies working age individuals as being in the labor force if during a
week of reference they were employed or wanted to work and were available to start
working within a week but also had actively looked for work during the past four weeks.
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2Several recent studies (Attanasio et al. 2011; Card et al. 2011; Hicks et al. 2011; Maitra
and Mani 2012; Macours et al. 2013; Blattman et al. 2013), report results from
randomized control trials of vocational training programs in developing countries
(Colombia, Dominican Republic, India, and Nicaragua, respectively), with mixed results
for employment and wage returns. Although the nature of the evidence in these studies
is compelling, the programs under study are short-term job training programs
implemented outside the public education system, making them not strictly comparable
to the South African vocational programs that I consider in this paper.
3A recent South African newspaper article put it more bluntly with the headline,
“Vocational education not an ‘option for losers’ ” (Nkosi 2012).
4Without loss of generality, I assume that each agent has acquired sufficient prior
schooling to make both types of schooling an option. In South Africa, students who have
completed 9 years of schooling may choose to continue in the academic system or
pursue vocational study.
5Although there is evidence that returns to schooling in South Africa are convex (Case
and Yogo 1999), the concavity assumption is made for convenience here to ensure an
interior solution, conditional on the agent choosing some positive amount of investment
in a schooling type.
6I frame the problem as static for simplicity of exposition. The model could be made
dynamic in a straightforward manner, adapting the dynamic discrete choice framework
of (Pugatch 2012).
7If academic and vocational schooling and the occupations associated with them
require distinct skills, then finding βv < βa need not indicate that vocational students
are poorly served by their choice. However, vocational students frequently began their
careers at comparable levels of academic schooling, with 97% of vocational secondary
students and 39% of vocational post-secondary students previously enrolled in academic
programs in each level. This suggests that students are experimenting with different
types of programs and should be concerned about their comparative returns.
8Note that the presence of the fixed cost makes it possible to observe an equilibrium in
which the marginal returns to schooling type v exceed those of type a, but many
students still optimally choose not to invest in type v schooling.
9In my sample, only 3% report ever working and attending school simultaneously. This
figure rises to just 5% among those who ever enrolled in a vocational program.
10I also exclude person-years corresponding to Wave 5 interviews suspected of
fraudulent data collection. See Appendix A for details.
11“Coloured” refers to people of mixed racial heritage and descendants of Cape Malay
slaves; the term is in common use among South Africans of all races. Coloured people
occupied an intermediate position under apartheid in which they faced major
restrictions on civil, political and economic activity, but not as severe as the majority
black population.
12Schools of all types are free to set their own admissions criteria and fees, but may not
discriminate on the basis of race, test scores, or the ability to pay (Fiske and Ladd 2004).
Reported school fees are considerably higher for vocational secondary programs than
academic, which may partly explain low vocational secondary enrollment. At the
post-secondary level, there are no appreciable differences in reported fees between
academic and vocational programs. The regression of (log) school fees on enrollment in
various programs yields: ln fee = 5.78
(184.5) + 1.81(8.1)vocsec + 2.91(43.5)acadpostsec+
2.86
(32.0)vocpostsec, where vocsec, acadpostsec, and vocpostsec are dummies for enrollment
in vocational secondary, academic post-secondary, and vocational post-secondary
programs, respectively; enrollment in academic upper secondary (grades 10-12) is the
omitted category. t-statistics from standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses.
13I use linear probability models because their coefficients may be interpreted as
marginal effects of changes in individual covariates, which is my focus in this paper.
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Results from conditional (fixed effects) logit estimation of models analogous to those in
this section yielded similar findings.
14Direct measures of shocks are excluded from these regressions because data
limitations would reduce the sample size and hamper the identification of individual
fixed effects. I examine the direct effect of shocks on enrollment and robustness of grade
failure measures to their inclusion in Section 4.1.2.
15Although the response to grade failure relative to mean enrollment in a schooling
program is informative, the safety valve hypothesis concerns the absolute response only.
Moreover, inclusion of individual fixed effects serves to control for an individual’s mean
enrollment rate in each program.
16To conduct these tests, I correct the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients from
paired academic/vocational enrollment regressions to account for correlation between
error terms. The procedure takes advantage of the equivalence between seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) and equation-by-equation OLS when the equations have
identical explanatory variables (Greene 2012).
17Table A1, column (9) verifies that the safety valve results for grade failure are not
driven by household formation for females.
18Intuitively, the motivation for the procedure is the assumption that “selection on the
unobservables is the same as selection on the observables” (Altonji et al. 2005). Formally,
in the Mincer regressions (8) that I run in this paper, the assumption is cov(Sv, ) = cov
(Sv,X), and analogously for Sa. Altonji et al. (2005) argue that this assumption is no
more restrictive than the standard OLS assumptions cov(Sv, ) = 0 and cov(X, ) = 0.
19The sample for all regressions in Table 6 is restricted to youth not enrolled in school.
I do not distinguish between full-time or part-time employment, as information on
hours worked is available only in the concurrent waves of the panel, not the life history.
Where data on working hours are available, 79% of the employed sample work full-time
(defined as an average of at least 35 hours per week).
20I also find evidence against the sinkhole hypothesis using pooled, semi-annual
samples of the South Africa Labour Force Survey (LFS): vocational schooling provides
larger wage and employment returns than academic schooling, with coefficients
significantly different from each other at the 1% level. I restrict the sample to black and
coloured youth from the Western Cape ages 14-26 observed between September
2002-September 2006 for maximum comparability with CAPS. Unlike CAPS, however,
the LFS lacks data on vocational post-secondary schooling, work experience and ability.
Results not shown but available upon request.
21Auxiliary analysis using a sample of workers aged 16-55 from the South African
Labour Force Survey suggest that this is the case in South Africa as well. Younger workers
with vocational schooling earn an experience premium relative to observationally
equivalent workers with academic schooling. However, the returns to experience for
workers with academic schooling overtakes that of vocationally-trained workers at age
44 for wages, 39 for employment. Results not shown but available upon request.
22This extension would make the framework similar to a Roy (1951) model in which
the agent has expectations over academic- and vocational-specific ability endowments.
The agent would choose the schooling track that offers higher expected return, with
revisions in expected returns due to failure altering choices for those at the margin.
23Note that examining job acquisition through formal versus informal channels is not
equivalent to the question of whether the jobs themselves are in the formal or informal
sector. South Africa is notable for its low rates of informality (Banerjee et al. 2008) and
lack of small firms (Magruder 2012). Unfortunately the data are not well suited to
explore this question because information that could be used to determine formality of
job sector is collected only in CAPSWave 2.
24The Cape Area Panel Study Waves 1-2-3 were collected between 2002 and 2005 by
the University of Cape Town and the University of Michigan, with funding provided by
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the US National Institute for Child Health and Human Development and the AndrewW.
Mellon Foundation.Wave 4 was collected in 2006 by the University of Cape Town, Univer-
sity of Michigan and Princeton University. Major funding for Wave 4 was provided by the
National Institute on Aging through a grant to Princeton University, in addition to fund-
ing provided byNICHD through the University ofMichigan.Wave 5 was collected in 2009
by the University of Cape Town. Major funding for Wave 5 was provided by the Health
Economics &HIV/AIDS ResearchDivision (HEARD) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal,
with additional funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (through the CSSR at
UCT), the European Union (through the Microcon research partnership on the micro-
foundations of violent conflict, via the CSSR) and the NICHD (through the University of
Michigan).
25A total of 289 young adult interviews in Wave 5 are suspected of occurring under
fraudulent conditions based on an investigation conducted by CAPS. These observations
are flagged in the data. Individuals withWave 5 interviews suspected of fraud account for
5% of my estimation sample.
26This derivation of omitted variable bias follows (Wooldridge 2001) closely.
Appendix
A Data definitions
The data come from retrospective life histories collected inWave 1 of the Cape Area Panel
Study (CAPS), augmented with events recorded inWaves 2-524. TheWave 1 retrospective
life histories record events by youth’s age, where age refers to the age at which the event
occurred in the case of living arrangements and marriage, and to age at the beginning of
the calendar year in the case of enrollment and progression through school, labor force
participation, and pregnancy. I follow this convention in mapping Wave 2-5 responses to
youth’s age.
I make several sample restrictions. I exclude whites. I keep only those observed until
at least age 18. Those who report advancing two or more grades in a year, or without
continuous information on enrollment, are dropped from the sample. I drop those whose
educational histories, by the definitions below, place them with less than 9 or more than
16 years of completed schooling. I exclude person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for
which fraudulent fieldwork was suspected25. Excluding whites and those not observed
until age 18 accounts for 56% of the observations dropped from the sample.
Schooling level covers grades 1-16, with National Technical Certificate (NTC) 1, 2, and
3 mapped to grades 10, 11, and 12, respectively. Students enrolled in university or uni-
versity of technology programs that include grade 12 are considered enrolled in grade 12.
I define “vocational” and “academic” schooling as a set of mutually exclusive categories.
Vocational schooling includes enrollment in National Training Certificate, university of
technology or other technical program that does not require matric (secondary com-
pletion); enrollment in all other programs, including traditional secondary schools,
universities, and diploma or certificate programs that do require matric, is academic
schooling.
Reporting successful completion of the grade level or reporting enrollment in a higher
grade level in a subsequent year is considered passing the level for grades 1-12. Beginning
at grade 13, reporting successful completion of the grade level or “no grade/continuing”












Table A1 Enrollment response to grade failure by program type: robustness to other shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: academic
Failed last -0.40 -0.48 -0.42 -0.48 -0.42 -0.48 -0.42 -0.40 -0.40
Grade enrolled (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)***
Previous grades -0.17 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.17 -0.17
Failed (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
R-squared 0.70 0.81 0.67 0.81 0.67 0.81 0.67 0.70 0.70
Panel B: vocational
Failed last -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Grade enrolled (0.005)* (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.005)* (0.01)
Previous grades 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Failed 0.00 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
R-squared 0.26 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.52 0.26 0.24
Observations 23,997 6,805 6,614 6,805 6,614 6,805 6,614 23,997 14,053
No. individuals 2,927 2,900 2,855 2,900 2,855 2,900 2,855 2,927 1,700
p-value of difference
Failed last 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Grade enrolled
Previous grades 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Failed
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample is person-years from estimation sample described in Appendix A, with completed
education 9 years or more, from CAPS life history panel. Excludes person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for which fraudulent fieldwork suspected. Vocational programs include technical colleges, NTC and universities of
technology. Re-enrollment refers to enrollment after at least one year of non-enrollment. Sample sizes drop in regressions including shocks because these only measured in Waves 1, 3 and 4. All regressions are
survey-weighted linear probability models that include individual fixed effects and age, completed schooling, and calendar year dummies. Key to included shocks in each regression, by column:
(1) none.
(2) any household shock, including death; serious illness or injury; job loss; major financial loss (including business failure or bankruptcy); abandonment or divorce; theft, fire or property damage; or other shock.
(3) any household shock (t − 1).
(4) death, serious illness or injury.
(5) death, serious illness or injury (t − 1).
(6) job loss; major financial loss; theft, fire or property damage.
(7) job loss; major financial loss; theft, fire or property damage (t − 1).
(8) pension eligibility (regression discontinuity specification).
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Table A2 Enrollment response to program-specific grade failure and previous
employment, by program type
Program type Academic Vocational Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2)
Failed last academic grade enrolled -0.40 -0.40 0.000 0.000 *** ***
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.004) (0.004)
Previous academic grades failed -0.18 -0.18 0.01 0.01 *** ***
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.004)** (0.004)*
Failed last vocational grade enrolled -0.09 -0.08 -0.17 -0.17
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
Previous vocational grades failed -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08)
Not employed last period 0.06 0.02 ***
(0.01)*** (0.004)***
Observations 23,997 23,997 23,997 23,997
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.27 0.27
No. individuals 2,927 2,927 2,927 2,927
Includes work experience x x
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Sample is person-years from estimation sample described in Appendix A, with completed education 9 years or more, from
CAPS life history panel. Excludes person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for which fraudulent fieldwork suspected. All
regressions are survey-weighted linear probability models that include individual fixed effects and age, completed
schooling, and calendar year dummies. Work experience variables include dummy for non-employment in last period of
non-enrollment and cumulative work experience. Vocational programs include technical colleges, NTC and universities of
technology.
I make this distinction because “no grade/continuing” is the modal response for those
enrolled in the post-secondary education sector, indicating that most youth are contin-
uing in their programs of higher education, whereas “passing” reports at these levels
drop considerably. Unfortunately, I am unable to determine whether students are making
satisfactory progress towards post-secondary degree completion. All other results while
enrolled are considered failure. I define “dropout” as non-enrollment following a year
of enrollment, and “re-enrollment” as enrollment following a year of non-enrollment.
Grades failed represent the accumulation of periods of enrollment in which the agent
did not pass the grade, and therefore may include events such as withdrawal, illness or
residential moves rather than outright academic failure.
Employment, wages, and work experience are conditional on non-enrollment at a given
age, where reports of enrollment supersede reports of labor market participation. Only
3% of individuals in the sample ever worked and enrolled in school simultaneously.Wages
are full-time annual equivalent based on 160 working hours per month (those reporting
monthly hours above 160 are considered full-time and do not receive an adjustment).
Wages are available only at the time of the interview, rather than as retrospective histories,
resulting in diminished sample sizes relative to employment histories. Wages refer to self-
reported earnings on current ormost recent jobs held among those not enrolled in school,
regardless of current employment status. Wages are denoted in real South African rand
per year (base year 2002), unless otherwise noted. The South African rand traded at 10.3
per US dollar in August 2002 when CAPSWave 1 began.
Other covariates are largely self-explanatory. Ability quantiles refers to full sample (i.e.,
before all restrictions imposed) rank of age-adjusted score on the literacy and numeracy












Table A3 Enrollment response to grade failure and previous employment, subsamples by program type
Subsample Secondary Post- Male Female Black Coloured Poorest Richest
secondary two quintiles three quintiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: academic
Failed last -0.49 -0.16 -0.39 -0.41 -0.36 -0.41 -0.44 -0.35
Grade enrolled (0.016)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.019)*** (0.016)*** (0.019)***
Previous grades -0.24 -0.03 -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 -0.18 -0.19 -0.15
Failed (0.014)*** (0.012)** (0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
R-squared 0.73 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.70
Panel B: vocational
Failed last -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Grade enrolled (0.005)*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.006)* (0.01)
Previous grades 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Failed (0.00) (0.01) (0.007)* (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
R-squared 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.27
Observations 11,846 12,151 9,944 14,053 11,625 12,372 12,185 11,812
No. individuals 1,602 1,325 1,227 1,700 1,522 1,405 1,564 1,363
p-value of difference
Failed last 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Grade enrolled
Previous grades 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Failed
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Sample is person-years from estimation sample described in Appendix A, with completed education
9 years or more, from CAPS life history panel. Excludes person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for which fraudulent fieldwork suspected. Regressions for secondary include only individuals with final attainment of 9-11 years
schooling, while regressions for post-secondary include only individuals with final attainment of at least 12 years schooling. Poorest and richest quintiles based on household per capita income in Wave 1. All regressions are
survey-weighted linear probability models that include individual fixed effects and age, completed schooling, and calendar year dummies. Vocational programs include technical colleges, NTC and universities of technology.
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Table A4 Schooling type and labor market outcomes, by race
Outcome (log) wages Employment Formal search
Race Black Coloured Black Coloured Black Coloured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Academic 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04
(0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)** (0.02)**
Vocational 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.22
(0.01)* (0.04)** (0.03)* (0.04)*** (0.18) (0.10)**
Observations 1,388 2,452 6,576 7,878 449 848
R-squared 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.25 0.07 0.06
No. individuals 678 998 1,437 1,374 356 676
H0: academic=vocational 0.34 0.79 0.53 0.07 0.51 0.07
U/O: academic 8.0 2.9 5.2 -3.3 3.6 1.6
U/O: vocational -2.8 1.2 -2.2 -2.4 -1.7 56.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Unit of observation is person-year. Sample restricted to person-years with at least 9 years completed schooling and not
currently enrolled. Excludes person-years corresponding to Wave 5 for which fraudulent fieldwork suspected. Wages are log
of monthly full-time equivalent wages based on 160 hours/month. Wages refer to self-reported earnings on current or most
recent jobs held among those not enrolled in school, regardless of current employment status, FTE based on 160 hours
worked/month. Employment restricted to periods when not enrolled in school. Dependent variable in formal search
regressions is indicator for job acquisition through formal method. Formal method of job acquisition refers to responding to
ad, sending CV, visiting firm, or using employment agency. All regressions include race, gender, and calendar year dummies;
and controls for age-adjusted LNE z-score, experience, experience squared, age, and age squared. Vocational schooling
includes NTC and other technical secondary, and universities of technology. Reported test statistics are p-values of indicated
null hypothesis. U/O ratio: ratio of selection on unobservables/observables required to explain away effect of schooling
variable on outcome, obtained as βC
βNC−βC , where βC is schooling coefficient frommodel with included controls and βNC is
schooling coefficient frommodel without controls. Controls as indicated and described above. See Appendix B for details.
Survey weights applied.
quintiles are derived from the distribution of household per capita income reported in
Wave 1 of CAPS. The pension-eligible grandfather/grandmother indicator is set to one if
there is at least one co-resident grandmother/grandfather on the household roster who is
of pension-eligible age (60 for females, 65 for males) in the relevant young adult person-
year. Grandparent ages are determined by extrapolating from ages reported in the most
recent panel wave, or Wave 1 for the retrospective histories. Co-residence is reported in
each year of the life histories. The variable definition also makes note of changes in the
household roster reported in Waves 2-5.
B The sinkhole hypothesis and selection on unobservables
To investigate the sinkhole hypothesis that vocational schooling generates lower labor
market returns than vocational schooling, I regress a labormarket outcome y on Sa and Sv,
the stocks of academic and vocational schooling, respectively. The parameters of interest
are βa and βv, the coefficients on academic and vocational schooling. The concern with
such regressions is that individuals will select into academic and vocational schooling
non-randomly, leading to inconsistent estimates of βa and βv.
To formalize this concern, suppose there is an index u that captures this selection effect,
so that the true model (with constant term and covariates as in (8) omitted for ease of
exposition) is26:
y = βaSa + βvSv + γu +  (9)
Omitting u from the regression means that the composite error term γu +  will be
correlated with the regressors of interest. Focusing on the consequence for estimating βa,
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consider the linear projection of u on Sa and Sv:
u = δaSa + δvSv + r (10)
Substituting (10) into (9) yields:
y = (βa + γ δa)Sa + (βv + γ δv)Sv + γ r +  (11)
Written in this form, the familiar omitted variables bias formula for βˆa follows:
plim βˆa,NC = βa + γ δa (12)
where the subscript NC denotes “no controls”.
Now suppose there is a set of controls X that is related to the selection term u in the
following way:
u = XβX + u˜
The availability of these controls allows me to rewrite the model as:
y = βaSa + βvSv + γ (XβX + u˜) +  (13)
Analogously to (10), write the linear projection of the omitted variable u˜ on the
observables as:
u˜ = θaSa + θvSv + XθX + ν (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) yields the counterparts to (11) and (12):
y = (βa + γ θa)Sa + (βv + γ θv)Sv + X(βX + γ θX)
+ γ ν +  (15)
plim βˆa,C = βa + γ θa (16)
where C refers to the model with controls.
Following (Bellows and Miguel 2009) application of (Altonji et al. 2005) methodology,
taking the ratio of (16) over the difference in the probability limits (12)-(16) under the null





The numerator on the right-hand side is the partial correlation between academic
schooling Sa and u˜, the remaining selection term after including the controls X. The
denominator is this term subtracted from the partial correlation between academic
schooling Sa and u, the selection term that includes the controls X. If the denominator
is small relative to the numerator and the controls X are representative of all possible
controls (Altonji et al. (2005) formalize this argument), then the selection term remain-
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The interpretation of this ratio becomes somewhat clearer if I further assume that δv =
θv = θX = 0, in which case we have:
δa = cov(Sa,u)var(Sa)





= γ cov(Sa,u − u˜)var(Sa)
= γ cov(Sa,XβX)var(Sa)
Again setting βa = 0 under the null hypothesis yields:
plim βˆa,C
βˆa,NC − βˆa,C
= cov(Sa, u˜)cov(Sa,XβX) (17)
The ratio on the right-hand side represents how strong the relationship between the
residual unobservable u˜ and Sa must be relative to that of the controls X to explain a
non-zero estimate of βˆa when βa = 0. A large ratio suggests that omitted variable bias
is unlikely to explain away the entire effect of academic schooling on y. (Altonji et al.
2005) interpret ratios greater than 3 as large, and ratios greater than 1 as suggestive of
non-zero treatment effects in the presence of possible selection on unobservables. A sim-
ilar argument can be made for the corresponding expression for the vocational schooling
coefficient βv.
The assumptions used to arrive at (17) are admittedly restrictive. In particular, the
assumptions that δv = θv = 0 are potentially problematic, as they require that voca-
tional schooling Sv is unrelated to the unobservables u and u˜ that determine selection into
academic schooling. (The assumption θX = 0 is not problematic, as it follows from the
definition of a linear projection.) Nonetheless, these assumptions are required to arrive at
the familiar omitted variables bias formula when there are more than two regressors, and
are therefore often invoked (Wooldridge 2001).
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